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HYPERHISTORY
More people are alive today than ever before in the evolution of humanity. And more of us live 
longer1 and better2 today than ever before. To a large measure, we owe this to our technologies, 
at least insofar as we develop and use them intelligently, peacefully, and sustainably.
Sometimes, we may forget how much we owe to flints and wheels, to sparks and ploughs, 
to engines and satellites. We are reminded of such deep technological debt when we divide 
human life into prehistory and history. That significant threshold is there to acknowledge that 
it was the invention and development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
that made all the difference between who we were and who we are. It is only when the lessons 
learned by past generations began to evolve in a Lamarckian rather than a Darwinian way that 
humanity entered into history.
History has lasted six thousand years, since it began with the invention of writing in the 
fourth millennium BC. During this relatively short time, ICTs have provided the recording  
and transmitting infrastructure that made the escalation of other technologies possible, 
with the direct consequence of furthering our dependence on more and more layers of 
technologies. ICTs became mature in the few centuries between Guttenberg and Turing. 
Today, we are experiencing a radical transformation in our ICTs that could prove equally 
The Copernican revolution displaced us from the center of 
the universe. The Darwinian revolution displaced us from 
the center of the biological kingdom. And the Freudian 
revolution displaced us from the center of our mental lives. 
Today, Computer Science and digital ICTs are causing a fourth 
revolution, radically changing once again our conception of 
who we are and our “exceptional centrality.” We are not at the 
center of the infosphere. We are not standalone entities, but 
rather interconnected informational agents, sharing with other 
biological agents and smart artifacts a global environment 
ultimately made of information. Having changed our views 
about ourselves and our world, are ICTs going to enable and 
empower us, or constrain us? The answer lies in an ecological 
and ethical approach to natural and artificial realities. We must 
put the “e” in an environmentalism that can deal successfully 
with the new issues caused by the fourth revolution.
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significant, for we have started drawing a new threshold between history and a new age, 
which may aptly be called hyperhistory (Figure 1). Let me explain.
Prehistory (i.e., the period before written records) and history work like adverbs: they tell 
us how people live, not when or where. From this perspective, human societies currently 
stretch across three ages, as ways of living. According to reports about an unspecified 
number of uncontacted tribes in the Amazonian region, there are still some societies 
that live prehistorically, without ICTs or at least without recorded documents. If one day 
such tribes disappear, the end of the first chapter of our evolutionary book will have been 
written. The greatest majority of people today still live historically, in societies that rely 
on ICTs to record and transmit data of all kinds. In such historical societies, ICTs have 
not yet overtaken other technologies, especially energy related ones, in terms of their 
vital importance. Then there are some people around the world who are already living 
hyperhistorically, in societies or environments where ICTs and their data processing 
capabilities are the necessary condition for the maintenance and further development 
of societal welfare, personal well-being, as well as intellectual flourishing. The nature 
of conflicts provides a sad test for the reliability of this tripartite interpretation of 
human evolution. Only a society that lives hyperhistorically can be vitally threatened 
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To summarize, human evolution may be visualized as a three-
stage rocket: in prehistory, there are no ICTs; in history, there 
are ICTs, they record and transmit data, but human societies 
depend mainly on other kinds of technologies concerning 
primary resources and energy; in hyperhistory, there are ICTs, 
they record, transmit, and, above all, process data, increasingly 
autonomously, and human societies become vitally dependent 
on them and on information as a fundamental resource. Added-
value moves from being ICT-related to being ICT-dependent. We 
can no longer unplug our world from ICTs without turning it off.
If all this is even approximately correct, the emergence from 
its historical age represents one of the most significant steps 
ever taken by humanity. It certainly opens up a vast horizon of 
opportunities as well as challenges and difficulties, all essentially 
driven by the recording, transmitting, and processing powers 
of ICTs. From synthetic biochemistry to neuroscience, from the 
Internet of Things to unmanned planetary explorations, from 
green technologies to new medical treatments, from social media 
to digital games, from agricultural to financial applications, 
from economic developments to the energy industry, our 
activities of discovery, invention, design, control, education, 
work, socialization, entertainment, care, security, business, 
and so forth would be not only unfeasible but unthinkable in 
a purely mechanical, historical context. They have all become 
hyperhistorical in nature today. It follows that we are witnessing 
the defining of a macroscopic scenario in which hyperhistory, 
and the re-ontologization of the infosphere in which we live, are 
quickly detaching future generations from ours.
Of course, this is not to say that there is no continuity, both backward and forward. Backward, 
because it is often the case that the deeper a transformation is, the longer and more widely 
rooted its causes may be. It is only because many different forces have been building the 
pressure for a very long time that radical changes may happen all of a sudden, perhaps 
unexpectedly. It is not the last snowflake that breaks the branch of the tree. In our case, it is 
certainly history that begets hyperhistory. There is no ASCII without the alphabet. Forward, 
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because it is most plausible that historical societies will survive for a long time in the future, 
not unlike those prehistorical Amazonian tribes mentioned before. Despite globalization, 
human societies do not parade uniformly forward, in synchronic steps.
Such a long-term perspective should help to explain the slow and gradual process of 
political apoptosis that we are undergoing, to borrow a concept from cell biology. Apoptosis 
(also known as programmed cell death) is a natural and normal form of self-destruction in 
which a programmed sequence of events leads to the self-elimination of cells. Apoptosis plays 
a crucial role in developing and maintaining the health of the body. One may see this as a 
dialectical process of renovation, and use it to describe the development of nation states into 
information societies in terms of political apoptosis (see Figure 2), in the following way.
Nation States  
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FROM THE STATE  
TO THE MASS
FIGURE 2
Oversimplifying, a quick sketch of the last four hundred years of political history may 
look like this. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) meant the end of World War Zero, namely 
the Thirty Years’ War, the Eighty Years’ War, and a long period of other conflicts during 
which European powers, and the parts of the world they dominated, massacred each other 
for economic, political, and religious reasons. Christians brought hell to each other with 
staggering violence and unspeakable horrors. The new system that emerged in those years, 
the so-called Westphalian order, saw the coming of maturity of sovereign states and then 
nation states as we still know them today, France, for example. Think of the time between 
the last chapter of The Three Musketeers—when D’Artagnan, Aramis, Porthos, and Athos 
take part in Cardinal Richelieu’s siege of La Rochelle in 1628—and the first chapter of 
Twenty Years Later, when they come together again, under the regency of Queen Anne 
of Austria (1601–66) and the ruling of Cardinal Mazarin (1602–61). The state became not a 
monolithic, single-minded, well-coordinated agent, the sort of beast (Hobbes’ Leviathan) or 
rather robot that a later, mechanical age would incline us to imagine. It never was. Rather, 
it rose to the role of the binding power, the network able to keep together, influence, and 
coordinate all the different agents and behaviors falling within the scope of its geographical 
borders. Citizenship had been discussed in terms of biology (your parents, your gender, 
your age…) since the early city-states of ancient Greece. It became more flexible (degrees of 
citizenship) when it was conceptualized in terms of legal status as well, as under the Roman 
Empire, when acquiring a citizenship (a meaningless idea in purely biological contexts) 
meant becoming a rights holder. 
With the modern state, geography started playing an equally 
important role, mixing citizenship with nationality and locality. 
In this sense, the history of the passport is enlightening. As a 
means to prove one’s own identity, it is acknowledged to be an 
invention of King Henry V of England (1386–1422), centuries 
before the Westphalian order took place. However, it is the 
Westphalian order that makes possible the passport as we 
understand it today: a document that entitles the holder not to 
travel (e.g., a visa may also be required) or be protected abroad, 
but to return to (or be sent back to) the country that issued the 
passport. It is, metaphorically, an elastic band that ties the 
holder to a geographical point, no matter how long in space and 
prolonged in time the journey in other lands is. Such a document 
became increasingly useful the better that geographical point was 
defined. Readers may be surprised to know that travelling was still 
quite passport-free in Europe until World War I, when security 
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pressure and techno-bureaucratic means caught up with  
the need to disentangle and manage all those elastic bands 
travelling around by train.
Back to the Westphalian order. Now the physical and legal 
spaces overlap and they are both governed by sovereign powers, 
which exercise control through physical force to impose laws 
and ensure their respect within the national borders. Mapping 
is not just a matter of travelling and doing business, but also 
an introvert question of controlling one’s own territory, and 
an extrovert question of positioning oneself on the globe. The 
taxman and the general look at those lines with eyes very different 
from those of today’s users of Expedia. For sovereign states act 
as multiagent systems (or MASs, more on them later) that can, 
for example, raise taxes within their borders and contract debts 
as legal entities (hence our current terminology in terms of 
“sovereign debt,” which are bonds issued by a national government 
in a foreign currency), and they can of course dispute borders. 
Part of the political struggle becomes not just a silent tension 
between different components of the state-MAS, say the clergy 
versus the aristocracy, but an explicitly codified balance between 
the different agents constituting it. In particular, Montesquieu 
suggests the classic division of the state’s political powers that 
we take for granted today. The state-MAS organizes itself as a 
network of three “small worlds”—a legislature, an executive, and a 
judiciary—among which only some specific kinds of information 
channels are allowed. Today, we may call this Westphalian 2.0.
With the Westphalian order, modern history becomes the age of the state, and the state 
becomes the information agent, which legislates on and controls (or at least tries to 
control), insofar as it is possible, all technological means involved in the information life 
cycle including education, census, taxes, police records, written laws and rules, press, and 
intelligence. Already most of the adventures in which D’Artagnan is involved are caused by 
some secret communication. The state thus ends by fostering the development of ICTs as a 
means to exercise and maintain political power, social control, and legal force, but in so doing 
it also undermines its own future as the only, or even the main, information agent.  
As I shall explain in more detail later, ICTs, as one of the most influential forces that made 
the state possible and then predominant as a historical driving force in human politics, 
also contributed to make it less central, in the social, political, and economic life across 
the world, putting pressure on centralized government in favor of distributed governance 
and international, global coordination. The state developed by becoming more and more 
an information society, thus progressively making itself less and less the main information 
agent. Through the centuries, it moved from being conceived as the ultimate guarantor 
and defender of a laissez-faire society to a Bismarckian welfare system that would take full 
care of its citizens. The two World Wars were also clashes of nation states resisting mutual 
coordination and inclusion as part of larger multiagent systems. They led to the emergence 
of MASs such as the League of Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and so forth. Today, we know that global 
problems—from the environment to the financial crisis, from social justice to intolerant 
religious fundamentalisms, from peace to health conditions—cannot rely on nation states 
as the only sources of a solution because they involve and require global agents. However, in 
a post-Westphalian world (Linklater, 1998), there is much uncertainty about the new MASs 
involved in shaping humanity’s present and future.
The previous remarks offer a philosophical way of interpreting the Washington 
Consensus, the last stage in the state’s political apoptosis. John Williamson coined the 
expression “Washington Consensus” in 1989, in order to refer to a set of ten specific policy 
recommendations that he found to constitute a standard strategy adopted and promoted by 
institutions based in Washington DC—such as the US Treasury Department, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank—when dealing with countries that needed to 
cope with economic crises. The policies concerned macroeconomic stabilization, economic 
opening with respect to both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within 
the domestic economy. In the past quarter of a century, the topic has been the subject of 
intense and lively debate, in terms of correct description and acceptable prescription: does 
the Washington Consensus capture a real historical phenomenon? Does the Washington 
Consensus ever achieve its goals? Is it to be re-interpreted, despite Williamson’s quite clear 
definition, as the imposition of neoliberal policies by Washington-based international 
financial institutions on troubled countries? These are important questions, but the real 
point of interest here is not the hermeneutical, economic, or normative evaluation of the 
Washington Consensus. Rather, it is the fact that the very idea, even if it remains only an 
influential idea, captures a significant aspect of our hyperhistorical, post-Westphalian 
time. For the Washington Consensus may be seen as the coherent outcome of the United 
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, also known as the Bretton Woods Conference 
(Steil, 2013). This gathering in 1944 of 730 delegates from all forty-four Allied nations at 
the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, regulated 
the international monetary and financial order after the conclusion of World War II. It saw 
the birth of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, together 
with its concessional lending arm, the International Development Association, it is known 
as the World Bank), of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which will be 
replaced by the World Trade Organization in 1995), and the International Monetary Fund. In 
short, Bretton Woods sealed the official emergence of a variety of MASs as supranational or 
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intergovernmental forces involved with the world’s political, social, and economic problems. 
Thus, Bretton Woods and later on the Washington Consensus highlight the fact that, after 
World War II, organizations and institutions (not only those in Washington DC) that are 
not states but rather nongovernmental MASs are openly acknowledged to act as major, 
influential forces on the political and economic scene internationally, dealing with global 
problems through global policies. The very fact (no matter whether correct or not) that the 
Washington Consensus has been accused of being widely mistaken in disregarding local 
specificities and global differences reinforces the point that a variety of powerful MASs are 
now the new sources of policies in the globalized information societies.
All this helps to explain why—in a post-Westphalian (emergence of the nation state as 
the modern, political information agent) and post-Bretton Woods (emergence of non-state 
MASs as hyperhistorical players in the global economy and politics) world—one of the main 
challenges we face is how to design the right sort of MASs that could take full advantage of 
the sociopolitical progress made in modern history, while dealing successfully with the new 
global challenges that are undermining the best legacy of that very progress in hyperhistory.
Among the many explanations for such a shift from a historical, Westphalian order to a 
post-Washington Consensus, hyperhistorical predicament in search of a new equilibrium, 
three are worth highlighting here.
First, power. ICTs “democratize” data and the processing/controlling power over them, 
in the sense that both now tend to reside and multiply in a multitude of repositories and 
sources, thus creating, enabling, and empowering a potentially boundless number of non-
state agents, from the single individual to associations and groups, from macro-agents, 
like multinationals, to international, intergovernmental, as well as nongovernmental 
organizations and supranational institutions. The state is no longer the only, and sometimes 
not even the main, agent in the political arena that can exercise informational power over 
other informational agents, in particular over (groups of) citizens. The phenomenon is 
generating a new tension between power and force, where power is informational, and 
exercised through the elaboration and dissemination of norms, whereas force is physical, 
and exercised when power fails to orient the behavior of the relevant agents and norms need 
to be enforced. The more physical goods and even money become information-dependent, 
the more the informational power exercised by MASs acquires a significant financial aspect.
Second, geography. ICTs de-territorialize human experience. They have made regional 
borders porous or, in some cases, entirely irrelevant. They have also created, and are 
exponentially expanding, regions of the infosphere where an increasing number of agents 
(not only human, see Floridi, 2013) operate and spend more and more time, the onlife 
experience. Such regions are intrinsically stateless. This is generating a new tension between 
geopolitics, which is global and non-territorial, and the nation state, which still defines its 
identity and political legitimacy in terms of a sovereign territorial unit, as a country.
Third, organization. ICTs fluidify the topology of politics. They do not merely enable 
but actually promote (through management and empowerment) the agile, temporary, and 
timely aggregation, disaggregation, and re-aggregation of distributed groups “on demand,” 
around shared interests, across old, rigid boundaries, represented by social classes, political 
parties, ethnicity, language barriers, physical barriers, and so forth. This is generating new 
tensions between the nation state, still understood as a major organizational institution, yet 
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no longer rigid but increasingly morphing into a very flexible MAS itself (I shall return to 
this point later), and a variety of equally powerful, indeed sometimes even more powerful 
and politically influential (with respect to the old nation state) non-state organizations, 
the other MASs on the block. Terrorism, for example, is no longer a problem concerning 
internal affairs—as some forms of terrorism in the Basque Country, Germany, Italy, or 
Northern Ireland were—but an international confrontation with a MAS such as Al-Qaeda, 
the notorious, global, militant Islamist organization.
The debate on direct democracy is thus reshaped. We used to think that it was about how 
the nation state could reorganize itself internally, by designing rules and managing the 
means to promote forms of democracy, in which citizens could propose and vote on policy 
initiatives directly and almost in real time. We thought of forms of direct democracy as 
complementary options for forms of representative democracy. It was going to be a world 
of “politics always-on.” The reality is that direct democracy has turned into a mass-media-
ted democracy in the ICT sense of new social media. In such digital democracies, MASs 
(understood as distributed groups, temporary and timely, and aggregated around shared 
interests) have multiplied and become sources of influence external to the nation state. 
Citizens vote for their representatives but influence them via opinion polls almost in real 
time. Consensus-building has become a constant concern based on synchronic information.
Because of the previous three reasons—power, geography, and organization—the unique 
position of the historical state as the information agent is being undermined from below 
and overridden from above by the emergence of MASs that have the data, the power (and 
sometimes even the force, as in the very different cases of the UN, of groups’ cyber threats, 
or of terrorist attacks), the space, and the organizational flexibility to erode the modern 
state’s political clout, to appropriate (some of) its authority and, in the long run, make it 
redundant in contexts where it was once the only or the predominant informational agent. 
The Greek crisis, which begun in late 2009, and the agents involved in its management, offer 
a good template: the Greek government and the Greek state had to interact “above” with 
the EU, the European Central Bank, the IMF, the rating agencies, and so forth, and “below” 
with the Greek mass media and the people in Syntagma square, the financial markets and 
international investors, German public opinion, and so forth.
Of course, the historical nation state is not giving up its role 
without a fight. In many contexts, it is trying to reclaim its 
primacy as the information superagent governing the political 
life of the society that it organizes. In some cases, the attempt 
is blatant. In the UK, the Labour government introduced 
the first Identity Cards Bill in November 2004. After several 
intermediary stages, the Identity Cards Act was finally repealed 
by the Identity Documents Act 2010, on January 21, 2011. The 
We might be moving from a Washington Consensus to a Beijing Consensus, described 
by Williamson as consisting of incremental reform, innovation, and experimentation, 
export-led growth, state capitalism, and authoritarianism. All this is risky, because 
the anachronistic historicism of some of China’s policies and humanity’s growing 
hyperhistoricism are heading toward a confrontation. It may not be a conflict, but 
hyperhistory is a force whose time has come, and while it seems very likely that it  
will be the Chinese state that will emerge deeply transformed, one can only hope that  
the inevitable friction will be as painless and peaceful as possible. The financial and  
social crises that the most advanced information societies are currently undergoing may 
failed plan to introduce compulsory ID in the UK should be 
read from a modern, Westphalian perspective. In many cases, 
it is “historical resistance” by stealth, as when an information 
society—which is characterized by the essential role played 
by intellectual, intangible assets (knowledge-based economy), 
information-intensive services (business and property services, 
finance and insurance), and public sectors (especially education, 
public administration, and health care)—is largely run by the 
state, which simply maintains its role of major informational 
agent no longer just legally, on the basis of its power over 
legislation and its implementation, but now also economically, 
on the basis of its power over the majority of information-based 
jobs. The intrusive presence of so-called “state capitalism”  
with its SOE (State Owned Enterprises) all over the world, 
from Brazil, to France, to China, is an obvious symptom of 
hyperhistorical anachronism.
Similar forms of resistance seem only able to delay the 
inevitable rise of political MASs. Unfortunately, they may 
involve huge risks, not only locally, but above all globally. 
Recall that the two World Wars may be seen as the end of the 
Westphalian system. Paradoxically, while humanity is moving 
into a hyperhistorical age, the world is witnessing the rise of 
China, currently a most “historical” sovereign state, and the 
decline of the US, a sovereign state that more than any other 
superpower in the past already had a hyperhistorical and 
multiagent vocation in its federal organization. 
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actually be the very painful but still peaceful price we need pay to adapt to a future post-
Washington Consensus order.
The previous conclusion holds true for the historical state in general: in the future, we 
shall see the political MASs acquire increasing prominence, with the state progressively 
abandoning its resistance to hyperhistorical changes and evolving into a MAS itself. Good 
examples are provided by devolution, or the growing trend in making central banks, like the 
Bank of England or the European Central Bank, independent, public organizations.
The time has come to consider the nature of the political MAS more closely and some of  
the questions that its emergence is already posing.
THE POLITICAL MASS
The political MAS is a system constituted by other systems,4 which, as a single agent, is:
a) teleological: the MAS has a purpose, or goal, which it pursues  
through its actions;
b) interactive: the MAS and its environment can act upon each other;
c) autonomous: the MAS can change its configurations without direct 
response to interaction, by performing internal transitions to change 
its states. This imbues the MAS with some degree of complexity and 
independence from its environment; and finally,
d) adaptable: the MAS’s interactions can change the rules by which the MAS 
changes its states. Adaptability ensures that the MAS learns its own mode of 
operation in a way that depends critically on its experience.
The political MAS becomes intelligent (in the sense of being smart) when it implements 
features a–d efficiently and effectively, minimizing resources, wastefulness and errors, while 
maximizing the returns of its actions. The emergence of intelligent, political MASs poses 
many serious questions, five of which are worth reviewing here, even if only quickly: identity 
and cohesion, consent, social versus political space, legitimacy, and transparency (the 
transparent MAS).
Identity and Cohesion
Throughout modernity, the state has dealt with the problem of establishing and maintaining 
its own identity by working on the equation between State = Nation, often through the legal 
means of Citizenship and the narrative rhetoric of Space (the Mother/Father Land) and 
Time (Story in the sense of traditions, recurrent celebrations of past nation-building events, 
etc.). Consider, for example, the invention of mandatory military service during the French 
Revolution, its increasing popularity in modern history, but then the decreasing number of 
sovereign states that still impose it nowadays. Conscription transformed the right to wage war 
from an eminently economic problem—Florentine bankers financed the English kings during 
the Hundred Years War (1337–1453), for example—into also a legal problem: the right of the 
state to send its citizens to die on its behalf, thus making human life the penultimate value, 
available for the ultimate sacrifice, in the name of patriotism. “For King and Country”: it  
is a sign of modern anachronism that, in moments of crisis, sovereign states still give in to 
the temptation of fuelling nationalism about meaningless, geographical spots, often some 
small islands unworthy of any human loss, from the Falkland Islands or Islas Malvinas to 
the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands.
The equation between State, Nation, Citizenship and Land/Story  
had the further advantage of providing an answer to a second 
problem, that of cohesion, for it answered not just the question of 
who or what the state is, but also the question of who or what belongs 
to the state and hence may be subject to its norms, policies, and 
actions. New political MASs cannot rely on the same solution. Indeed, 
they face the further problem of having to deal with the decoupling  
of their political identity and cohesion. The political identity of 
a MAS may be very strong and yet unrelated to its temporary and 
rather loose cohesion, as is the case with the Tea Party movement 
in the US. Both identity and cohesion of a political MAS may be 
rather weak, as in the international Occupy movement. Or one may 
recognize a strong cohesion and yet an unclear or weak political 
identity, as with the population of tweeting individuals and their 
role during the Arab Spring. Both identity and cohesion of a political 
MAS are established and maintained through information sharing. 
The Land is virtualized into the region of the infosphere in which the 
MAS operates. So Memory (retrievable recordings) and Coherence 
(reliable updates) of the information flow enable a political MAS 
to claim some identity and some cohesion, and therefore offer a 
sense of belonging. But it is, above all, the fact that the boundaries 
between the online and offline are disappearing, the appearance of 
the onlife experience, and hence the fact that the virtual infosphere 
can affect politically the physical space, that reinforces the sense of 
the political MAS as a real agent. If Anonymous had only a virtual 
existence, its identity and cohesion would be much less strong.  
Deeds provide a vital counterpart to the virtual information flow  
to guarantee cohesion. An ontology of interactions replaces an 
ontology of entities, or, with a word play, ings (as in interact-ing, 
process-ing, network-ing, do-ing, be-ing, etc.) replace things.
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Consent
A significant consequence of the breaking up of the equation “political MAS = Nation State = 
Citizenship = Land = Story” and of the decoupling of identity and cohesion in a political MAS is 
that the age-old theoretical problem of how consent to be governed by a political authority arises 
is being turned on its head. In the historical framework of social contract theory, the presumed 
default position is that of a legal opt-out: there is some kind of (to be specified) a priori, original 
consent, allegedly given (for a variety of reasons) by any individual subject to the political 
state, to be governed by the latter and its laws. The problem is to understand how such consent 
is given and what happens when an agent, especially a citizen, opts out of it (the out-law). In 
the hyperhistorical framework, the expected default position is that of a social opt-in, which 
is exercised whenever the agent subjects itself to the political MAS conditionally, for a specific 
purpose. Oversimplifying, we are moving from being part of the political consensus to taking 
part in it, and such part-taking is increasingly “just in time,” “on demand,” “goal-oriented,” 
and anything but permanent or long-term, and stable. If doing politics looks increasingly like 
doing business it is because, in both cases, the interlocutor, the citizen-customer needs to be 
convinced every time anew. Loyal membership is not the default position, and needs to be built 
and renewed around political and commercial products alike. Gathering consent around specific 
political issues becomes a continuous process of (re)engagement. It is not a question of political 
attention span—the generic complaint that “new generations” cannot pay sustained attention 
to political problems anymore is unfounded; they are, after all, the generations that binge-watch 
TV—but of motivating interest again and again, without running into semantic inflation (one 
more crisis, one more emergency, one more revolution, one more…) and political fatigue (how 
many times do we need to intervene urgently?). The problem is therefore to understand what 
may motivate repeatedly or indeed force agents (again, not just individual human beings, but 
all kinds of agents) to give such consent and become engaged, and what happens when such 
agents, unengaged by default (note, not disengaged, for disengagement presupposes a previous 
state of engagement), prefer to stay away from the activities of the political MAS, inhabiting a 
social sphere of civil but apolitical “nonimity” (lack of anonymity). Failing to grasp the previous 
transformation from historical opt-out to hyperhistorical opt-in means being less likely to 
understand the apparent inconsistency between the disenchantment of individuals with politics 
and the popularity of global movements, international mobilizations, activism, voluntarism, 
and other social forces with huge political implications. What is moribund is not politics tout 
court, but historical politics, that based on parties, classes, fixed social roles, and the nation 
state, which sought political legitimacy only once and spent it until revoked. The inching toward 
the so-called center by parties in liberal democracies around the world, as well as the “Get out 
the vote” strategies (GOTV is a term used to describe the mobilization of voters as supporters 
to ensure that those who can do vote) are evidence that engagement needs to be constantly 
renewed and expanded in order to win an election. Party (as well as Union) membership is a 
modern feature that is likely to become increasingly less common.
Social vs. Political Space
Understanding the previous inversion of default positions means being faced by a further 
problem. Oversimplifying once more, in prehistory, the social and the political spaces overlap 
because, in a stateless society, there is no real difference between social and political relations 
and hence interactions. In history, the state seeks to maintain such coextensiveness by 
occupying, as an informational MAS, all the social space politically, thus establishing the 
primacy of the political over the social. This trend, if unchecked and unbalanced, risks 
leading to totalitarianisms (e.g., the Italy of Mussolini), or at least broken democracies (e.g., 
the Italy of Berlusconi). We have seen earlier that such a coextensiveness and its control may 
be based on normative or economic strategies, through the exercise of power, force, and 
rule-making. In hyperhistory, the social space is the original, default space from which agents 
may move to (consent to) join the political space. It is not accidental that concepts such as 
civil society (in the post-Hegelian sense of nonpolitical society), public sphere (also in a non-
Habermasian sense), and community become increasingly important the more we move into 
a hyperhistorical context. The problem is to understand such social space where agents of 
various kinds are supposed to be interacting and which gives rise to the political MAS.
Each agent, as described earlier, has some degrees of freedom. By this I do not mean 
liberty, autonomy or self-determination, but rather, in the robotic, more humble sense, some 
capacities or abilities, supported by the relevant resources, to engage in specific actions for 
a specific purpose. To use an elementary example, a coffee machine has only one degree of 
freedom: it can make coffee, once the right ingredients and energy are supplied. The sum  
of an agent’s degrees of freedom is its “agency.” When the agent is alone, there is of course 
only agency, but no social let alone political space. Imagine Robinson Crusoe on his “Island 
of Despair.” However, as soon as there is another agent (Friday on the “Island of Despair”), or  
indeed a group of agents (the native cannibals, the shipwrecked Spaniards, the English 
mutineers), agency acquires the further value of multiagent (i.e., social) interaction: practices 
and then rules for coordination and constraint of the agents’ degrees of freedom become 
essential, initially for the well-being of the agents constituting the MAS, and then for the 
well-being of the MAS itself. Note the shift in the level of analysis: once the social space arises, 
we begin to consider the group as a group—for example, as a family, or a community, or as a 
society—and the actions of the individual agents constituting it become elements that lead to 
the MAS’s newly established degrees of freedom, or agency. The previous simple example may 
still help. Consider now a coffee machine and a timer: separately, they are two agents with 
different agency, but if they are properly joined and coordinated into a MAS, then the issuing 
agent has the new agency to make coffee at a set time. It is now the MAS that has a more 
complex capacity, and that may or may not work properly.
A social space is thus the totality of degrees of freedom of the 
inhabiting agents one wishes to take into consideration. In 
history, such consideration—which is really just another level of 
analysis—was largely determined physically and geographically, 
in terms of presence in a territory, and hence by a variety of 
forms of neighborhood. In the previous example, all the agents 
interacting with Robinson Crusoe are taken into consideration 
because of their relations (interactive presence in terms of their 
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Legitimacy
It is when the agents in the social space agree to agree on how to deal with their divergences 
(conflicts) and convergences that the social space acquires the political dimension to which 
we are so used. Yet two potential mistakes await us here.
The first, call it Hobbesian, is to consider politics merely as the prevention of war by other 
means, to invert the famous phrase by Carl von Clausewitz, according to which “war is the 
continuation of politics by other means.” This is not the case, because even a complex society 
of angels (Homo hominis agnus) would still require rules in order to further its harmony. 
Convergences too need politics. Out of metaphor, politics is not just about conflicts due to the 
agents’ exercises of their degree of freedom when pursuing their goals. It is also, or at least it 
should be, above all, the furthering of coordination and collaboration of degrees of freedom 
by means other than coercion and violence.
degree of freedom) to the same “Island of Despair.” We saw that 
ICTs have changed all this. In hyperhistory, where to draw the line 
to include, or indeed exclude, the relevant agents whose degrees 
of freedom constitute the social space has become increasingly 
a matter of at least implicit choice, when not of explicit decision. 
The result is that the phenomenon of distributed morality, 
encompassing that of distributed responsibility, is becoming more 
and more common. In either case, history or hyperhistory, what 
counts as a social space may be a political move. Globalization is a 
de-territorialization in this political sense.
If we now turn to the political space in which the new MASs 
operate, it would be a mistake to consider it a separate space, over 
and above the social one: both are determined by the same totality 
of the agents’ degrees of freedom. The political space emerges when 
the complexity of the social space—understood in terms of number 
and kinds of interactions and of agents involved, and of degree of 
dynamic reconfiguring of both agents and interactions—requires 
the prevention or resolution of potential divergences and the 
coordination or collaboration about potential convergences. Both 
are crucial. And in each case more information is required, in terms 
of representation and deliberation about a complex multitude of 
degrees of freedom. The result is that the social space becomes 
politicized through its informatization.
The second, and one may call this potential mistake Rousseauian, is that it may seem that 
the political space is then just that part of the social space organized by law. In this case, the 
mistake is subtler. We usually associate the political space with the rules or laws that regulate  
it but the latter are not constitutive, by themselves, of the political space. Compare two cases  
in which rules determine a game. In chess, the rules do not merely constrain the game, they  
are the game because they do not supervene on a previous activity: rather, they are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that determine all and only the moves that can be legally 
made. In football, however, the rules are supervening constraints because the agents enjoy a 
previous and basic degree of freedom, consisting in their capacity to kick a ball with the foot  
in order to score a goal, which the rules are supposed to regulate. Whereas it is physically 
possible, but makes no sense, to place two pawns on the same square of a chessboard, nothing 
impeded Maradona from scoring an infamous goal by using his hand in the Argentina vs. 
England football match (1986 FIFA World Cup), and that to be allowed by a referee who did not 
see the infringement.
Once we avoid the two previous mistakes, it is easier to see that the political space is that 
area of the social space constrained by the agreement to agree on resolution of divergences and 
coordination of convergences. This leads to a further consideration, concerning the transparent 
MAS, especially when, in this transition time, the MAS in question is still the state.
The Transparent MAS
There are two senses in which the MAS can be transparent. Unsurprisingly, both come from 
ICTs and Computer Science (Turilli & Floridi, 2009), one more case in which the information 
revolution is changing our mental frameworks.
On the one hand, the MAS (think of the nation state, and also corporate agents, 
multinationals, or supranational institutions, etc.) can be transparent in the sense that it 
moves from being a black box to being a white box. Other agents (citizens, when the MAS is 
the state) not only can see inputs and outputs—for example, levels of tax revenue and public 
expenditure—they can also monitor how (in our running example, the state as) a MAS works 
internally. This is not a novelty at all. It was a principle already popularized in the nineteenth 
century. However, it has become a renewed feature of contemporary politics due to the 
possibilities opened up by ICTs. This kind of transparency is also known as Open Government.
On the other hand, and this is the more innovative sense that I wish to stress here, the  
MAS can be transparent in the same sense in which a technology (e.g., an interface) is: invisible, 
not because it is not there, but because it delivers its services so efficiently, effectively, and 
reliably that its presence is imperceptible. When something works at its best, behind the 
scenes as it were, to make sure that we can operate as efficiently and as smoothly as possible, 
then we have a transparent system. When the MAS in question is the state, this second sense 
of transparency should not be seen as a surreptitious way of introducing, with a different 
terminology, the concept of “Small State” or “Small Governance.” On the contrary, in this 
second sense, the MAS (the state) is as transparent and as vital as the oxygen that we breathe. It 
strives to be the ideal butler.5 There is no standard terminology for this kind of transparent MAS 
that becomes perceivable only when it is absent. Perhaps one may speak of Gentle Government. 
It seems that MASs can increasingly support the right sort of ethical infrastructure (more on 
this later) the more transparently, that is, openly and gently, they play the negotiating game 
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through which they take care of the res publica. When this negotiating game fails, the possible 
outcome is an increasingly violent conflict among the parties involved. It is a tragic possibility 
that ICTs have seriously reconfigured.
All this is not to say that opacity does not have its virtues. Care should be exercised, lest the 
sociopolitical discourse is reduced to the nuances of higher quantity, quality, intelligibility, 
and usability of information and ICTs. The more the better is not the only, nor always the best, 
rule of thumb. For the withdrawal of information can often make a positive and significant 
difference. We already encountered Montesquieu’s division of the state’s political powers. 
Each of them may be carefully opaque in the right way to the other two. For one may need to 
lack (or intentionally preclude oneself from accessing) some information in order to achieve 
desirable goals, such as protecting anonymity, enhancing fair treatment, or implementing 
unbiased evaluation. Famously, in Rawls (1999), the “veil of ignorance” exploits precisely this 
aspect of information, in order to develop an impartial approach to justice. Being informed 
is not always a blessing and might even be dangerous or wrong, distracting or crippling. The 
point is that opacity cannot be assumed to be a good feature in a political system unless it is 
adopted explicitly and consciously, by showing that it is not a mere bug.
INFRAETHICS
Part of the ethical efforts engendered by our hyperhistorical condition concerns the design of 
environments that can facilitate MASs’ ethical choices, actions, or process. This is not the same 
as ethics by design. It is rather pro-ethical design, as I hope will become clearer in the following 
pages. Both are liberal, but the former may be mildly paternalistic, insofar as it privileges 
the facilitation of the right kind of choices, actions, process or interactions on behalf of the 
agents involved, whereas the latter does not have to be, insofar as it privileges the facilitation 
of reflection by the agents involved on their choices, actions, or process.6 For example, the 
former may let people opt out of the default preference according to which, by obtaining a 
driving licence, one is also willing to be an organ donor. The latter may not allow one to obtain 
a driving license unless one has decided whether one wishes to be an organ donor. In this 
section, I shall call environments that can facilitate ethical choices, actions, or process, the 
ethical infrastructure, or infraethics. I shall call the reader’s attention to the problem of how to 
design the right sort of infraethics for the emerging MASs. In different contexts or cases, the 
design of a liberal infraethics may be more or less paternalistic. My argument is that it should 
be as little paternalistic as the circumstances permit, although no less.
It is a sign of the times that, when politicians speak of 
infrastructure nowadays, they often have in mind ICTs. They 
are not wrong. From business fortunes to conflicts, what 
makes contemporary societies work depends increasingly on 
bits rather than atoms. We already saw all this. What is less 
obvious, and philosophically more interesting, is that ICTs seem to 
have unveiled a new sort of equation.
Consider the unprecedented emphasis that ICTs have placed on 
crucial phenomena such as trust, privacy, transparency, freedom of 
expression, openness, intellectual property rights, loyalty, respect, 
reliability, reputation, rule of law, and so forth. These are probably 
better understood in terms of an infrastructure that is there to 
facilitate or hinder (reflection upon) the im/moral behavior of the 
agents involved. Thus, by placing our informational interactions 
at the center of our lives, ICTs seem to have uncovered something 
that, of course, has always been there, but less visibly so: the fact 
that the moral behavior of a society of agents is also a matter of 
“ethical infrastructure” or simply infraethics. An important aspect 
of our moral lives has escaped much of our attention and indeed 
many concepts and related phenomena have been mistakenly 
treated as if they were only ethical, when in fact they are probably 
mostly infraethical. To use a term from the philosophy of 
technology, they have a dual-use nature: they can be morally good, 
but also morally evil (more on this presently). The new equation 
indicates that, in the same way that business and administration 
systems, in an economically mature society, increasingly require 
infrastructures (transport, communication, services, etc.), so 
too, moral interactions increasingly require an infraethics, in an 
informationally mature society.
The idea of an infraethics is simple, but can be misleading. The previous equation helps to 
clarify it. When economists and political scientists speak of a “failed state,” they may refer 
to the failure of a state-as-a-structure to fulfill its basic roles, such as exercising control over 
its borders, collecting taxes, enforcing laws, administering justice, providing schooling, and 
so forth. In other words, the state fails to provide public (e.g., defense and police) and merit 
(e.g., health care) goods. Or (too often an inclusive and intertwined or) they may refer to the 
collapse of a state-as-an-infrastructure or environment, which makes possible and fosters 
the right sort of social interactions. This means that they may be referring to the collapse of 
a substratum of default expectations about economic, political, and social conditions, such 
as the rule of law, respect for civil rights, a sense of political community, civilized dialogue 
among differently minded people, ways to reach peaceful resolutions of ethnic, religious, or 
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cultural tensions, and so forth. All these expectations, attitudes, practices, in short such 
an implicit “sociopolitical infrastructure,” which one may take for granted, provides a 
vital ingredient for the success of any complex society. It plays a crucial role in human 
interactions, comparable to the one that we are now accustomed to attributing to physical 
infrastructures in economics.
Thus, infraethics should not be understood in terms of Marxist theory, as if it were a 
mere update of the old “base and superstructure” idea, because the elements in question 
are entirely different: we are dealing with moral actions and not-yet-moral facilitators 
of such moral actions. Nor should it be understood in terms of a kind of second-order 
normative discourse on ethics, because it is the not-yet-ethical framework of implicit 
expectations, attitudes, and practices that can facilitate and promote moral decisions and 
actions. At the same time, it would also be wrong to think that an infraethics is morally 
neutral. Rather, it has a dual-use nature, as I anticipated earlier: it can both facilitate and 
hinder morally good as well as evil actions, and do this in different degrees. At its best, it 
is the grease that lubricates the moral mechanism. This is more likely to happen whenever 
having a “dual-use” nature does not mean that each use is equally likely, that is, that the 
infraethics in question is still not neutral, nor merely positive, but does have a bias to 
deliver more good than evil. If this is confusing, think of a the dual-use nature not in terms 
of an equilibrium, like an ideal coin that can deliver both heads and tail, but in terms of a 
co-presence of two alternative outcomes, one of which is more likely than the other, like 
in a biased coin more likely to turn heads than tails. When an infraethics has a “biased 
dual-use” nature, it is easy to mistake the infraethical for the ethical, since whatever helps 
goodness to flourish or evil to take root partakes of their nature.
Any successful complex society, be this the City of Man or the 
City of God, relies on an implicit infraethics. This is dangerous, 
because the increasing importance of an infraethics may lead to 
the following risk: that the legitimization of the ethical ground 
is based on the “value” of the infraethics that is supposed to 
support it. Supporting is mistaken for grounding, and may 
even aspire to the role of legitimizing, leading to what Lyotard 
criticized as mere “performativity” of the system, independently 
of the actual values cherished and pursued. Infraethics is 
the vital syntax of a society, but it is not its semantics, to use 
a distinction popular in artificial intelligence. It is about the 
structural form, not the meaningful contents.
We saw earlier that even a society in which the entire 
population consisted of angels, that is, perfect moral agents, 
still needs norms for collaboration. Theoretically, that is, when 
one assumes that morally good values and the infraethics 
that promotes them may be kept separate (an abstraction 
that never occurs in reality but that facilitates our analysis), a 
society may exist in which the entire population consisted of 
Nazi fanatics who could rely on high levels of trust, respect, 
reliability, loyalty, privacy, transparency, and even freedom of 
expression, openness, and fair competition. Clearly, what we 
want is not just the successful mechanism provided by the right 
infraethics, but also the coherent combination between it and 
morally good values, such as civil rights. This is why a balance 
between security and privacy, for example, is so difficult to 
achieve, unless we clarify first whether we are dealing with a 
tension within ethics (security and privacy as a moral rights), 
within infraethics (both are understood as not-yet-ethical 
facilitators), or between infraethics (security) and ethics 
(privacy), as I suspect. To rely on another analogy: the best 
pipes (infraethics) may improve the flow but do not improve the 
quality of the water (ethics), and water of the highest quality is 
wasted if the pipes are rusty or leaky. So creating the right sort 
of infraethics and maintaining it is one of the crucial challenges 
of our time, because an infraethics is not morally good in itself, 
but it is what is most likely to yield moral goodness if properly 
designed and combined with the right moral values. The right 
sort of infraethics should be there to support the right sort of 
axiology (theory of value). It is certainly a constitutive part of 
the problem concerning the design of the right MASs.
The more complex a society becomes, the more important and hence salient the role of a 
well-designed infraethics is, and yet this is exactly what we seem to be missing. Consider 
the recent Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a multinational treaty concerning 
the international standards for intellectual property rights. By focusing on the enforcement 
of IPR (intellectual property rights), supporters of ACTA completely failed to perceive 
that it would have undermined the very infraethics that they hoped to foster, namely one 
promoting some of the best and most successful aspects of our information society. It would 
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have promoted the structural inhibition of some of the most important individuals’ positive 
liberties and their ability to participate in the information society, thus fulfilling their own 
potential as informational organisms. For lack of a better word, ACTA would have promoted 
a form of informism, comparable to other forms of social agency’s inhibition such as classism, 
racism, and sexism. Sometimes a defense of liberalism may be inadvertently illiberal. If we 
want to do better, we need to grasp that issues such as IPR are part of the new infraethics for 
the information society, that their protection needs to find its carefully balanced place within 
a complex legal and ethical infrastructure that is already in place and constantly evolving, and 
that such a system must be put at the service of the right values and moral behaviors. This 
means finding a compromise, at the level of a liberal infraethics, between those who see new 
legislation (such as ACTA) as a simple fulfillment of existing ethical and legal obligations (in 
this case from trade agreements), and those who see it as a fundamental erosion of existing 
ethical and legal civil liberties.
In hyperhistorical societies, any regulation affecting how people deal with information is 
now bound to influence the whole infosphere and onlife habitat within which they live. So 
enforcing rights (such as IPR) becomes an environmental problem. This does not mean that any 
legislation is necessarily negative. The lesson here is one about complexity: since rights such as 
IPR are part of our infraethics and affect our whole environment understood as the infosphere, 
the intended and unintended consequences of their enforcement are widespread, interrelated, 
and far-reaching. These consequences need to be carefully considered, because mistakes will 
generate huge problems that will have cascading costs for future generations, both ethically and 
economically. The best way to deal with “known unknowns” or unintended consequences is to 
be careful, stay alert, monitor the development of the actions undertaken, and be ready to revise 
one’s decision and strategy quickly, as soon as the wrong sort of effects start appearing. Festina 
lente, “more haste, less speed” as the classic adage suggests. There is no perfect legislation but 
only legislation that can be perfected more or less easily. Good agreements about how to shape 
our infraethics should include clauses about their timely update.
Finally, it is a mistake to think that we are like outsiders ruling over an environment 
different from the one we inhabit. Legal documents (such as ACTA) emerge from within 
the infosphere that they affect. We are building, restoring, and refurbishing the house from 
inside, or one may say that we are repairing the raft while navigating on it, to use the metaphor 
introduced in the Preface. Precisely because the whole problem of respect, infringement, and 
enforcement of rights (such as IPR) is an infraethical and environmental problem for advanced 
information societies, the best thing we could do, in order to devise the right solution, is to 
apply to the process itself the very infraethical framework and ethical values that we would like 
to see promoted by it. This means that the infosphere should regulate itself from within, not 
from an impossible without.
CONCLUSION: THE LAST OF THE HISTORICAL GENERATIONS?
Six thousand years ago, a generation of humans witnessed the invention of writing and the 
emergence of the conditions of possibility of cities, kingdoms, empires, and nation states. 
This is not accidental. Prehistoric societies are both ICT-less and stateless. The state is a 
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typical historical phenomenon. It emerges when human groups stop living a hand-to-
mouth existence in small communities and begin to live a mouth-to-hand one, in which 
large communities become political societies, with division of labor and specialized 
roles, organized under some form of government, which manages resources through the 
control of ICTs, including that very special kind of information called “money.” From 
taxes to legislation, from the administration of justice to military force, from census to 
social infrastructure, the state was for a long time the ultimate information agent and so I 
suggested that history, and especially modernity, is the age of the state.
Almost halfway between the beginning of history and now, Plato was still trying to make 
sense of both radical changes: the encoding of memories through written symbols and the 
symbiotic interactions between individuals and polis-state. In fifty years, our grandchildren 
may look at us as the last of the historical, state-organized generations, not so differently 
from the way we look at the Amazonian tribes mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
as the last of the prehistorical, stateless societies. It may take a long while before we come 
to understand in full such transformations. And this is a problem, because we do not have 
another six millennia in front of us. We cannot wait for another Plato in a few millennia. We 
are playing an environmental gambit with ICTs, and we have only a short time to win the 
game, for the future of our planet is at stake. We better act now.
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